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ABSTRACT
Various forefront countermeasure methods for automatic
speaker verification (ASV) with considerable performance in
anti-spoofing are proposed in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge.
However, previous work has shown that countermeasure
models are vulnerable to adversarial examples indistinguish-
able from natural data. A good countermeasure model should
not only be robust against spoofing audio, including syn-
thetic, converted, and replayed audios; but counteract delib-
erately generated examples by malicious adversaries. In this
work, we introduce a passive defense method, spatial smooth-
ing, and a proactive defense method, adversarial training, to
mitigate the vulnerability of ASV spoofing countermeasure
models against adversarial examples. This paper is among
the first to use defense methods to improve the robustness
of ASV spoofing countermeasure models under adversarial
attacks. The experimental results show that these two defense
methods positively help spoofing countermeasure models
counter adversarial examples.
Index Terms— Adversarial attack, spoofing countermea-
sure, adversarial training, anti-spoofing, spatial smoothing
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification, abbreviated as ASV, refers to
the task of ascertaining whether an utterance was spoken by
a specific speaker. ASV is undisputedly a crucial technol-
ogy for biometric identification, which is broadly applied in
real-world applications like banking and home automation.
Considerable performance improvements in terms of both ac-
curacy and efficiency of ASV systems have been achieved
through active research in a diversity of approaches [1–6]. [4]
proposed a method that use the Gaussian mixture model to
extract acoustic features and then apply the likelihood ratio
for scoring. An end-to-end speaker verification model that di-
rectly maps an utterance into a verification score is proposed
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by [5] to improve verification accuracy and make the ASV
model compact and efficient.
Recently, improving the robustness of ASV systems
against spoofing audios, such as synthetic, converted, and
replayed audios, has attracted increasing attention. The au-
tomatic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures
challenge [7–9], which is now in its third edition, aims at
developing reliable spoofing countermeasures which can
counteract the three kinds of spoofing audios mentioned
above. The ASVspoof 2019 takes both logical access (LA)
and physical access (PA) into account. The LA scenario con-
tains artificially generated spoofing audios by modern text-
to-speech and voice conversion models, and the PA scenario
contains replayed audios. A variety of state-of-the-art coun-
termeasure methods that aim at anti-spoofing for ASV models
are proposed, and these have achieved considerable perfor-
mance level for anti-spoofing [10–14]. However, whether
these countermeasure models can defend against deliberately
generated adversarial examples remain to be investigated.
Adversarial examples [15] are generated by maliciously
perturbing the original input with a small noise. The pertur-
bations are almost indistinguishable to humans but can cause
a well-trained network to classify incorrectly. Using delib-
erately generated adversarial examples to attack machine
learning models is called adversarial attack. Previous work
has shown that image classification models are subject to ad-
versarial attacks [15]. The spoofing countermeasure models
for ASV learned by the backpropagation algorithm also have
such intrinsic blind spots to adversarial examples [16]. These
intrinsic blind spots must be fixed to ensure safety.
To mitigate the vulnerability of spoofing countermeasure
models to adversarial attacks, we introduce a passive defense
method, namely spatial smoothing, and a proactive defense
method, namely adversarial training. Two countermeasure
models in ASVspoof 2019 [11, 12] are constructed, and we
implement adversarial training and spatial smoothing to im-
prove the reliability of these two models. This work is among
the first to explore defense against adversarial attacks for
spoofing countermeasure models.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
introduce the procedure of adversarial example generation.
Section 3 gives the detailed structure of two countermeasure
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models for subsequent experiments. In Section 4, we de-
scribe two defense approaches, namely spatial smoothing and
adversarial training. The experimental result and analysis are
shown in Section 5. Finally, conclusion and future work are
given in Section 6.
2. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE GENERATION
2.1. Adversarial Example Generation
We can generate adversarial examples by adding a minimally
perceptible perturbation to the input space. The perturbation
is found by solving an optimization problem. There are two
kinds of adversarial attacks: targeted attacks and nontargeted
attacks. Targeted attacks aim at maximizing the probability
of a targeted class which is not the correct class. Nontargeted
attacks aim at minimizing the probability of the correct class.
We focus on targeted attacks in this work. Specifically, to
generate adversarial examples, we fix the parameters θ of a
well-trained model and perform gradient descent to update
the input. Mathematically, we want to find a sufficiently small
perturbation δ that satisfies (see Equation 1):
x˜ = x+ δ,
fθ(x) = y,
fθ(x˜) = y˜,
δ ∈ ∆,
(1)
where f is a well-trained neural network parameterized by θ,
x ∈ RN is the input data with dimensionality N , y is the
true label corresponding to x, y˜ is a randomly selected label
where y˜ 6= y, x˜ ∈ RN is the perturbed data, δ ∈ RN is a
small perturbation and ∆ is the feasible set of δ. Finding a
suitable δ is a constrained optimization problem and we can
use descent method to solve it. ∆ can be a small l∞-norm
ball:
∆ = {δ| ||δ||∞ ≤ }, (2)
where  ≥ 0 and  ∈ R. The constraint in Equation 2 is a box
constrain and clipping is used to make the solution x˜ feasible.
We choose the feasible set ∆ as shown in Equation 2.
The projected gradient descent method, abbreviated as
PGD method is an iterative method for adversarial attack and
has shown effective attack performance in various tasks [17].
In this work, the PGD method is introduced to generate
adversarial examples. The PGD method is specified in Al-
gorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, xK is the returned adversarial
example, the clip() function applies element-wise clipping to
make sure ||xk − x||∞ ≤  and  ∈ R+.
3. ASV SPOOFING COUNTERMEASURE MODELS
Inspired by the ASV spoofing countermeasure models in the
ASVspoof 2019 challenge [9, 11, 12], we construct two kinds
Algorithm 1 Projected Gradient Descent Method
Require: x and y, input and its corresponding label. y˜ is a
selected label and y˜ 6= y. α, step size. K, the number of
iterations.
1: Initialize x0 = x;
2: for k = 0; k < K; k + + do
3: ˆxk+1 = clip(xk + α · sign(∇xkLoss(θ, xk, y˜)));
4: if Loss(θ, xk+1, y˜) < Loss(θ, xk, y˜) then
5: xk+1 = ˆxk+1
6: else
7: xk+1 = xk
8: end if
9: end for
10: return xK ;
of single models to conduct defense methods. The description
of these two models will be given in the subsequent parts.
3.1. VGG-like Network
The VGG network, a model made up of convolution layers
and pooling layers, has shown remarkable performance in im-
age classification. [11] studied VGG from the perspective of
automatic speaker verification and proposed a VGG-like net-
work with good performance on anti-spoofing for ASV. Based
on this finding, we modified VGG to address anti-spoofing
and the modified network structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. VGG-like network architecture.
Type Filter Output
Conv2D-1-1 3× 3 64× 600× 257
MaxPool-1 2× 2 64× 300× 128
Conv2D-2-1 3× 3 128× 300× 128
MaxPool-2 2× 2 128× 150× 64
Conv2D-3-1 3× 3 256× 150× 64
Conv2D-3-2 3× 3 256× 150× 64
MaxPool-3 2× 2 256× 75× 32
Conv2D-4-1 3× 3 512× 75× 32
Conv2D-4-2 3× 3 512× 75× 32
MaxPool-4 2× 2 512× 37× 16
Conv2D-5-1 3× 3 512× 37× 16
Conv2D-5-2 3× 3 512× 37× 16
MaxPool-5 2× 2 512× 18× 8
Avgpool − 512× 7× 7
Flatten − 25088
FC − 4096
FC − 4096
FC(softmax) − 2
3.2. Squeeze-Excitation ResNet model
Lai et al. [12] proposed the Squeeze-Excitation ResNet model
(SENet) to address anti-spoofing for ASV. The system pro-
posed by [12] ranked 3rd and 14th for the PA and LA scenar-
ios respectively in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. However,
[16] successfully attacked the SENet by deliberately gener-
ated adversarial examples. Hence, this work seeks to improve
the robustness of SENet with two defense methods elaborated
below.
4. DEFENSE METHODS
There are two kinds of defense methods against adversarial at-
tacks: passive defense and proactive defense. Passive defense
methods aim at countering adversarial attacks without modi-
fying the model. Proactive defense methods train new models
which are robust to adversarial examples. Two defense meth-
ods are introduced in this section: spatial smoothing which
is inexpensive and complementary to other defense methods
and adversarial training.
4.1. Spatial Smoothing
Spatial smoothing (referred as ”filtering”) has been widely
used for noise reduction in image processing. It is a method
that uses the nearby pixels to smooth the central pixel. There
are a variety of smoothing methods based on different weight-
ing mechanisms of nearby pixels, e.g., median filter, mean fil-
ter, Gaussian filter, etc. Take the mean filter as an example,
a slicing window moves over the picture and the central pixel
in the window will be substituted by the mean of the values
within the slicing window.
Spatial smoothing was introduced by [18] to harden image
classification models by detecting malicious generated adver-
sarial examples. Implementing smoothing does not need extra
training effort, so we use this inexpensive strategy to improve
the robustness of well-trained ASV models.
4.2. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training, which utilizes adversarial examples and
injects them into training data, was introduced in [19] to mit-
igate the vulnerability of deep neural networks against adver-
sarial examples. Adversarial training can be seen as a com-
bination of an inner optimization problem and an outer op-
timization problem where the goal of the inner optimization
is to find imperceptible adversarial examples and the goal of
outer optimization is to fix the blind spots. In this work, we
also employ adversarial training. First, we use clean exam-
ples to pre-train the countermeasure models for T1 epochs.
Then we do adversarial training for T2 epochs. The detailed
implementation procedure is shown in Algorithm 2.
5. EXPERIMENT
5.1. Experiment Setup
In this paper, we use the LA partition of the ASVspoof 2019
dataset [9]. The LA partition is divided into training, develop-
ment and evaluation sets. The training and development sets
Algorithm 2
Require: X and Y , set of paired audio and its corresponding
labels. θ, network parameters. T1, normal training epoch.
T2, adversarial training epoch. N , number of training
examples, b, batch size.
1: Initialize θ.
2: for t = 0; t < T1; t+ + do
3: for i = 0;i < N/b;i+ + do
4: Get {(xi, yi)}i=bi=1 from {X,Y };
5: Update θ using gradient decent with respect to
{(xi, yi)}i=bi=1;
6: end for
7: end for
8: while {t <= T2 & θ not converged} do
9: for i = 0; i < N/b; i+ + do
10: Get {(xi, yi)}i=bi=1 from {X,Y };
11: Generate adversarial examples {(x˜i)}i=bi=1 by PGD
method;
12: Update θ using gradient decent with respect to
{(x˜i, yi)}i=bi=1;
13: end for
14: end while
15: return θ;
are generated by the same kinds of TTS or VC models while
the evaluation set contains examples generated by different
kinds of TTS or VC models. We trained and then tested on the
development set to ensure similar distributions between the
datasets. Raw log power magnitude spectrum computed from
raw audio waveform is used as acoustic features. A Ham-
ming window of size 1724 and step-size of 0.001s is used to
extract FFT spectrum. We use only the first 600 frames of
each utterance for training and testing. We do not employ
additional preprocessing methods such as dereverberation or
pre-emphasis.
The network structures of the two countermeasure mod-
els were as described in Section 3. During the experiment,
we first use the training data to pre-train the countermeasure
models. Then the PGD method as shown in Algorithm 1 is
adopted to generate adversarial examples for the well-trained
countermeasure models. When we run the PGD method,  is
set to 5, K is set to 10 and α is set to 0.5. Then we mea-
sure the performance of well-trained countermeasure models
by the generated adversarial examples with and without fil-
ters. Three kinds of filters including median filter, mean filter
and Gaussian filter are implemented. Then we use adversarial
training to train the countermeasure model for T2 epochs as
shown in Algorithm 2. After adversarial training, we evaluate
the testing accuracy of countermeasure models for adversarial
examples.
5.2. Results and Analyses
5.2.1. Spatial Smoothing
After we pre-train VGG and SENet for T1 epochs, we eval-
uate the testing accuracy of these two models. According to
Table 2, both SENet and VGG achieve high testing accuracy
in the testing data which is not perturbed. However, when we
test the two models with adversarial examples, the testing ac-
curacy drops drastically. When we apply spatial smoothing to
the adversarial examples and then evaluate the performance,
the adversarial attack becomes ineffective as there is a great
increase in testing accuracy. All three kinds of spatial filters
have considerable performance in improving the robustness
of countermeasure models against adversarial examples. The
improvement obtained with Gaussian filters is much less than
the other two filters.
We attempt to explain the contribution of spatial smooth-
ing contributes to spoofing countermeasure model to be ro-
bust against adversarial examples. In the adversarial attack
scenario, an adversary has full access to a well-trained model
but can not alter the parameters of the model. Now, assum-
ing that the adversary is not aware of the existence of spatial
smoothing which will be implemented to the input data before
the input is thrown into the model. The adversary attempts to
find an imperceptible noise which will cause the well-trained
model to classify incorrectly by the PGD method and add it
to the input. However, the deliberately generated perturbation
will be countered by spatial smoothing and the adversarial at-
tack becomes invalid.
Table 2. Testing accuracy of VGG and SENet before adver-
sarial training.
SENet VGG
Normal examples 99.97% 99.99%
Adversarial examples 48.32% 37.06%
Adversarial examples
+ median filter
82.00% 92.72%
Adversarial examples
+ mean filter
82.39% 93.95%
Adversarial examples
+ Gaussian filter
78.93% 84.39%
5.2.2. Adversarial Training
As shown in Table 3, the testing accuracy for adversarial ex-
amples of SENet increases from 48.32% to 92.40% while
the testing accuracy for normal examples changes little af-
ter adversarial training. We can see a similar phenomenon
for VGG. According to Table 3, adversarial training does im-
prove the robustness of VGG and SENet.
Traditional supervised training does not address the cho-
sen models to be robust to adversarial examples. So the well-
trained models by traditional supervised learning may be sen-
sitive to changes in its input space and thus have vulnera-
Table 3. Testing accuracy of VGG and SENet after adversar-
ial training.
SENet VGG
Normal examples 99.75% 99.99%
Adversarial examples 92.40% 98.60%
Adversarial examples
+ median filter
93.74% 98.96%
Adversarial examples
+ mean filter
93.76% 99.24%
Adversarial examples
+ Gaussian filter
83.72% 87.22%
ble blind spots that can be attacked by a malicious adver-
sary. During the training stage, adversarial attacks should be
taken into account by training on a mixture of data which con-
tains not only clean examples but also adversarial examples to
regularize and make the model insensitive on all data points
within the max norm box. After doing that, it is hard for ma-
licious adversaries to generate adversarial examples to attack
the model. Adversarial training largely samples adversarial
examples within the  max norm box to augment the training
set. The results in Table 3 illustrate that it is feasible and prac-
tical to train a robust countermeasure model using adversarial
training.
5.2.3. Adversarial Training + Spatial Smoothing
We combine spatial smoothing and adversarial training and
the experiment results are shown in Table 3. We observe that
equipping adversarial training with median filters or mean fil-
ters increase the testing accuracy for adversarial examples,
as compared to solely using adversarial training. But adding
Gaussian filters decreases the testing accuracy. Hence, Me-
dian filters and mean filters are more desirable filters than
Gaussian filters in our experiment setting.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two kinds of defense methods, namely spatial
smoothing and adversarial training, are introduced to improve
the robustness of spoofing countermeasure models under ad-
versarial attacks. We implement two countermeasure models,
i.e., VGG and SENet and augment them with defense meth-
ods. The experiment results show both spatial smoothing and
adversarial training enhance robustness of the models against
adversarial attacks.
For future work, we will introduce powerful defense
methods, such as ensemble adversarial training [20], to make
spoofing countermeasure models more robust to adversarial
audios generated from testing data having different distribu-
tion with training data.
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